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INCREASING THE AWARENESS OF 
ADVANCE DIRECTIVES IN MARYLAND 
Maria Ellena Carey* 
A mentally competent person has the right to make 
his own medical decisions. Unfortunately, accident or 
illness can impair the ability to make these decisions. An 
advance directive enables a person to set forth certain 
health care decisions, such as whether to withhold or 
withdraw life-sustaining treatment and who should 
make these health care decisions if he is rendered 
incapable of doing so. Without an advance directive, 
someone unaware of the person's health care prefer-
ences may be given the power to make the medical 
decisions for him. 
Medical and technological advancements have made 
it possible to extend a person's life longer than ever 
before. As a result, a person may face a multitude of 
medical decisions never before considered. Despite the 
compelling reasons for advance directives, little is 
known about their actual use. 
Although physicians seem to favor advance direc-
tives for medical care, they are reluctant to initiate 
discussion about them. I In fact, physicians are often 
unaware of whether patients have directives.2 Recent 
studies reveal that while an overwhelming majority of 
individuals want to participate in their health care 
decisions,3 very few people actually discuss such issues 
with their doctors, family, or friends.4 In 1987, only nine 
percent of Americans had written advance directives for 
medical care.5 
Recent studies have identified several barriers to 
executing directives. The most common is the lack of 
physician initiative in discussing the issue.6 Another is 
the patient's difficulty in completing an advance direc-
tive due to lack of reading comprehension.? Other 
impediments include procrastination, the belief that 
advance planning is relevant only to the sick and elderly, 
and the belief that someone else will take care ofthese 
decisions.s One of the least frequently cited barriers is 
the disturbing nature of the topic.9 
Three events have increased the awareness of ad-
vance directives in Maryland. First, the United States 
Supreme Court decision in Cruzan v. Director, Mis-
souri Department of Health lO addressed constitutional 
issues in the termination of life support. Second, the 
Patient Self-Determination Actll was passed, requiring 
Medicare-certified health care facilities to educate their 
patients, their staff, and the community about the rights 
of a patient to make his own health care decisions. 
Third, the Maryland Health Care Decision Actl2 ex-
panded state law as to advance directives and extended 
the requirements of the Patient Self-Determination Act 
to all health care facilities. 
CRUZAN V. DIRECTOR, MISSOURI DEPART-
MENT OF HEALTH 
In 1990, the United States Supreme Court consid-
ered the case of Nancy Beth Cruzan, a young woman 
left in a persistent vegetative state as a result of an 
automobile accident. After the accident, doctors im-
planted a gastrostomy feeding tube. Years later, Cruzan's 
parents sought to have the feeding tube removed. 13 
The trial court approved the request of Cruzan's 
parents, basing its decision on a conversation between 
Cruzan and a friend. According to her friend, Cruzan 
stated that if she were sick or injured she would not want 
to continue her life unless she could live somewhat 
normally. 14 
The Missouri Supreme Court reversed the trial 
court's decision, holding that the state's interest in 
maintaining Cruzan's life outweighed Cruzan's rightto 
refuse treatment. 15 The court stated that clear and 
convincing evidence of the patient's desire to forego 
life-sustaining treatment is needed before such treat-
ment can be withheld,16 and, in this case, the evidence 
offered was not sufficient. I? 
The United States Supreme Court, by a five-to-four 
vote, affirmed the decision of the Missouri Supreme 
Court. 18 The Court held that a state may apply a clear 
and convincing evidence standard in proceedings where 
a guardian seeks to discontinue nutrition and hydration 
of a person diagnosed to be in a persistent vegetative 
state. 19 The Court invoked the same balancing test, 
weighing a competent person's constitutionally pro-
tected liberty interest in refusing unwanted medical 
treatment against a state's interest in the preservation of 
human life. Because the choice between life and death 
is a deeply personal decision, a state may seek to 
safeguard the personal element of 
the decision through the imposi-
relevant state interests to be considered are "the pres-
ervation oflife; the prevention of suicide; the protection 
of the interests of innocent third parties; and the main-
tenance of the ethical integrity of the medical profes-
sion. "28 
The Court of Appeals of Maryland addressed life-
sustaining treatment issues in Mack v. Mack,29 which 
was in accord with the opinion of the Attorney General. 
THE PATIENT SELF -DETERMINATION ACT 
In October 1989, while the Cruzan case was pend-
ing before the Supreme 
Court, the Patient Self-De-
tion of a heightened evidentiary 
requirement. 20 
The dissents vigorously ar-
gued that the right to be free from 
unwanted treatment cannot be 
outweighed by any interest of the 
state and that the clear and con-
vincing standard was too strin-
gent.21 
The Patient Self 
Determination Act 
applies to all M edi-
care-certified facili-
ties, requiring them 
termination Act 30 (the 
"PSDA") was introduced. 
The PSDA applies to all 
Medicare-certified facili-
ties,31 requiring them to pro-
vide for the dissemination of 
information regarding ad-
vance directives to the pub-
lic.32 Signed into law on No-
vember 5, 1990, the PSDA 
became effective on Decem-
ber 1, 1991 Y 
The Court implied that the 
right to refuse medical treatment 
generally encompasses the right 
to refuse artificially administered 
food and water. 22 It appears that 
to provide for the 
dissemination of in-
formation regarding 
advance directives to 
the public. 
Cruzan and the statis-
tics regarding advance di-
rectives were the driving 
forces behind the enactment of the PSDA.34 In 1939, 
only thirty-seven percent of the population died in 
institutions; in 1990, it was estimated that eighty per-
cent of the popUlation died in institutions.35 Approxi-
mately eighty percent of the deaths in institutions 
involve a decision regarding whether to apply, with-
hold, or withdraw a medical procedure.36 
at least five justices, but as many 
as eight, accepted the proposition that a competent 
person has a constitutional right to withhold or with-
draw the medical intervention necessary to supply food 
and waterY The Supreme Court, however, has never 
ruled on this issue. 
In an opinion written shortly after the Cruzan 
decision,24 the Mary land Office of the Attorney General 
stated that Cruzan reaffirmed the following conclusions 
discussed in an opinion written two years earlier:25 (1) 
that a competent person has a right to decide whether 
to accept life-sustaining treatment, including artificially 
administered sustenance; (2) that a competent person 
can use an advance directive to plan for decisionmaking 
even ifthe person later becomes disabled; and (3) that 
a disabled person who has not prepared an advance 
directive nonetheless has a right to have a surrogate 
(e.g., a family member or a guardian) make the decision 
on the person's behalf.26 
The Attorney General's opinion implies that Mary-
land also uses a balancing of interests test. 27 The 
By the time the PSDA was introduced, most states 
had provisions for living wills and/or durable powers of 
attorney for health care.37 Most people, however, did 
not know anything about the laws or the availability of 
the documents, including physicians. In a survey in 
Colorado, it was found that seventy-four percent of 
physicians had no knowledge about the living will law 
of that state.38 In a similar survey in Arkansas, only 
thirty-eight percent of doctors reported being familiar 
with the state advance directive laws.39 While ninety-
five percent ofthe people in the country had indicated 
thatthey would like to make an advance directive for the 
future oftheir health care, only nine percent had actually 
.. -=.25. 1 / U. 8alt. :".? - ~~ 
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done So.4O In addition, only four percent of the hospitals 
in the country asked patients upon admission whether 
they had an advance directive.41 
Requirements of health care providers. The 
PSDA requires hospitals, skilled care facilities, home 
health agencies, hospice programs, and health mainte-
nance organizations that participate in the Medicare 
program to maintain written policies and procedures 
guaranteeing that every adult receiving medical care be 
given written information concerning a patient's right 
to be involved in his own health care decisions.42 
Specifically, the provider or organization must provide 
written information describing the 
individual's right to make his own 
- -----~----------- -------==--:1 
directive.47 
Health care providers are also required to provide 
or participate in the education of their staff and the 
community on issues concerning advance directives.48 
To fulfill its community education obligation, a pro-
vider or organization may incorporate information in its 
existing publications or it may simply distribute to the 
public the same pamphlet which it distributes to its 
inpatients.49 All that is required is that "[t]he educa-
tional materials ... inform the public oftheir rights under 
state law to make decisions concerning the receipt of 
medical care by or through the provider or organization; 
the right to formulate advance 
directives; and the provider or 
decisions under state law, includ-
ing the right to accept or reject 
treatment and the right to execute 
an advance directive as well as 
information describing the writ-
ten policies of the provider or 
organization regarding the imple-
mentation of those rights.43 
Enacted almost two 
years after the imple-
organization's implementation 
policies concerning advance di-
rectives. "50 
mentation of the 
PSDA, the Maryland 
Health Care Decision 
Act (the "HCDA'1 is 
Requirements of the states. 
Each state is required to develop 
and maintain a written descrip-
tion of the state's law concerning 
advance directives. 51 The descrip-
tion may be written by a state 
agency, association, or other pri-
vate nonprofit entity, and is to be 
made available to health care pro-
viders or organizations for distri-
bution to the public. 52 
The written information must 
be provided by hospitals at the 
time of admission as an inpatient, 
by skilled nursing facilities at the 
time of admission as a resident, by 
home health agencies before the 
individual comes under the care 
a comprehensive 




of the agency, by hospice pro-
grams at the time of the initial 
receipt of hospice care, and by health maintenance 
organizations at the time of enrollment. 44 If a patient is 
incapacitated at the time that he is to receive the 
information, the patient's family or surrogate must be 
given the information. Once the patient is no longer 
incapacitated, however, the facility is obligated to pro-
vide the information to the patient.45 Although the 
PSDA applies only to Medicare-certified facilities, the 
information must be given to all patients, not just 
Medicare patients. 
In addition to distributing written information, the 
provider or organization must document each patient's 
medical record as to whether the patient has executed 
an advance directive.46 Furthermore, the PSDA explic-
itly states that a provider may not condition the provi-
sion of care or otherwise discriminate against an indi-
vidual based on whether he has executed an advance 
Requirements of the Secre-
tary of Health and Human Ser-
vices. In accordance with the 
PSDA, the Secretary of Health and Human Services is 
required to develop and implement a national campaign 
to inform the public of the option to execute advance 
directives and the right to participate in and direct health 
care decisions. 53 The Secretary is also responsible for 
developing or approving nationwide informational 
materials to be distributed by providers to inform the 
public and the medical and legal professions of a 
person's rights concerning medical care decisions. These 
materials must address the right to accept or refuse 
medical or surgical treatment and the existence of 
advance directives. 54 Finally, the Secretary is required 
to work with the states in preparing material describing 
applicable state law,55 to mail information to Social 
Security recipients, and to add a description of the new 
law to the Medicare handbook. 56 
Effect of the PSDA. Information provided at a 
national conference on the PSDA in January 1993 
revealed that both the number of people completing 
advance directives and the public's knowledge about 
advance directives increased after the PSDA was passed. 
After the PSDA went into effect, the percentage of 
patients who had completed an advance directive, either 
in the form of a living will or a power of attorney for 
health care, increased approximately 2.5 percent.57 
While this increase is marginal, the proportion of pa-
tients with increased knowledge regarding advance 
directives increased approximately 10 percent.58 Al-
though public awareness may have increased slightly, 
more needs to be done to increase the awareness and 
encourage the execution of advance directives. 
THE MARYLAND HEALTH CARE DECISION 
ACT 
Enacted almost two years after the implementation 
ofthe PSDA, the Mary land Health Care Decision Act59 
(the "HCDA") is a comprehensive reform of the law in 
Maryland regarding health care decisionmaking. The 
first of the four parts60 of the HCDA increases the 
number of available methods by which an individual 
may make decisions about future medical contingencies 
and confirms an individual's right to designate a health 
care agent.61 The HCDA provides that a competent 
person may make an advance directive by one or more 
ofthree methods: (1) a written directive authorizing the 
provision, withholding; or withdrawal of health care; 
(2) a written directive appointing an agent to make 
health care decisions according to the advance direc-
tive, the known wishes of the declarant, or, if the 
declarant's wishes are not known, the best interest of 
the declarant; and (3) an oral directive authorizing the 
provision, withholding, or withdrawal of health care or 
appointing an agent to make health care decisions.62 
The HCDA contains two suggested health care 
decisionmaking forms. The first (Form I) is a living 
Will,63 which under prior Maryland law applied only if 
the person was terminally ill.64 The HCDA allows a 
person to direct that life-sustaining procedures be with-
held or withdrawn not only ifhe is in a terminal condition 
but also if he is in a persistent vegetative state.65 A 
terminal condition is defined as "an incurable condition 
h· h ak d h .. "66 A . ... W IC ... m es eat Immment.... persIstent 
vegetative state is "a condition ... in which a patient has 
suffered a loss of consciousness ... and from which .. 
. it can be determined ... that there can be no recovery. "67 
The second form (Form II) has two parts. Part A 
allows a person to appoint a health care agent68 who is 
given the authority to make health care decisions, obtain 
and consent to the disclosure of medical information, 
employ and discharge health care providers, authorize 
admission to or discharge from health care facilities, and 
consent to the provision, withholding, or withdrawal of 
health care, including life-sustaining procedures. 69 The 
document also allows the person to limit the authority 
of the agent and to specify when the directive becomes 
effective, either when two physicians certify that he is 
incapable of making his own decisions or when the 
document is signed.70 The agent is instructed to make 
decisions based on the declarant's wishes or, if his 
wishes are unknown or unclear, based on what is in the 
declarant's best interest. 71 
Part B of Form II is similar to Form I in that it is a 
living will directing the refusal oflife-sustaining treat-
ment when a person is in a terminal condition or a 
persistent vegetative state.72 This form, however, also 
allows a person to direct the provision, withholding, or 
withdrawal oflife-sustaining treatment ifhe is inan end-
stage condition.73 An end-stage condition is "an ad-
vanced, progressive, irreversible condition ... that has 
caused severe and permanent deterioration indicated by 
incompetency and complete physical dependency ... 
and . . . for which . . . treatment of the irreversible 
condition would be medically ineffective."74 
Both suggested advance directive forms permit a 
person to state that he be given all available medical 
treatment in accordance with accepted health care 
standards. These forms also allow for modifications in 
decisions concerning life-sustaining procedures ifthe 
person is pregnant. 75 
The second part of the HCDA authorizes surrogate 
decisionmaking on behalf ofincapaci tated patients who 
did not designate a health care agent, subject to certain 
standards and limitations.76 In order of priority, a 
surrogate may be: 
1. a guardian for the patient, if one has been 
appointed; 
2. the patient's spouse; 
3. an adult child of the patient; 
4. a parent of the patient; 
5. an adult brother or sister of the patient; or 
6. a friend or other relative of the patient who 
presents an affidavit to the attending physician stating 
that the surrogate is a relative or close friend of the 
----~----------------.--... - -_. ----_ ... _. -.. _.", _.25.1 / U. Bali:. L.F. - 27/ 
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patient and stating the facts and circumstances demon-
strating that the person has maintained regular contact 
with the patient sufficient to be familiar with the patient's 
activities, health, and personal beliefs.77 
If a surrogate knows enough to judge what the 
person would decide if he were able, the surrogate 
should be able to make that decision. This form of 
decisionmaking is called "substituted judgment. "78 If 
the surrogate does not know what the person would 
choose if he were able, the surrogate must base a 
decision on the 0 bjecti ve costs and benefits oftreatment 
to determine what is in the person's best interest. 79 The 
"substituted judgment" standard is preferred because 
the surrogate is carrying out the decisions the patient 
would have chosen.80 
Under the HCDA, any dispute among surrogates 
with equal decisionmaking priority shall be referred to 
the institution's patient care advisory committee. The 
health care provider may either act in accordance with 
the committee's recommendation or transfer the patient 




The Cruzan case, the PSDA, and the HCDA have 
made the public aware of its rights to participate in and 
control future health care decisions. The three events 
have had several positive effects. 
The PSDA encourages patient, staff, and commu-
nity education. In addition, the HCDA extends the 
requirements of the PSDA to all health care facilities, 
not just those that are Medicare-certified.82 A person's 
knowledge about his rights enables him to get past some 
of the barriers which kept him from executing an 
advance directive. 83 
Each of these three events recognizes advance 
directives as the best method of ensuring that personal 
health care decisions will be followed. 84 In addition, the 
advance directive provides the necessary evidence of 
the patient's preferences. 
Even if a person does not execute an advance 
directive, he may be stimulated to discuss health care 
preferences with family members, friends, and health 
care providers. The surrogate must rely on his knowl-
edge about the patient and his discussions with the 
patient so that, in the absence of an advance directive, 
his wishes may be followed. This, however, is not a 
reliable method of providing for health care prefer-
ences. The state may limit the authority of the surro-
gate, and the surrogate may not actually know the 
patient's desires. 
Although public awareness of advance directives 
and their import has increased, there are still several 
problems left unresolved. 
Only minimum communication is required by the 
PSDA. A provider or organization is only required to 
give written information. The materials do not ensure 
knowledge and understanding ofthe subject matter. As 
mentioned earlier, reading comprehension of the pa-
tient may present an obstacle. Furthermore, the abun-
dance of paperwork may inhibit examination. 
There is no requirementthat the patient be given the 
opportunity to execute an advance directive. In fact, no 
one is required to discuss the information with a patient. 
Only inpatients are targeted by the PSDA. Routine 
medical services, such as physicals and outpatient visits, 
are not covered by the PSDA. 
The PSD A, while focusing on informing the public, 
only requires that information be provided upon admis-
sion as an inpatient. The need for an advance directive 
may arise before admission. By the time of admission, 
the patient is often unable to execute an advance 
directive or communicate his wishes due to incapacity 
or incompetency. 
The PSDA requires that a patient's medical record 
indicate if he has an advance directive but does not 
require the provider or organization to obtain a copy of 
the advance directive. The directive is essentially 
worthless if the provider or organization does not know 
the content of the directive. 
The PSDA requires education, but it provides no 
funding for the education. A provider or organization 
is left to balance the obligation to inform the public with 
the burden of funding the education. The competing 
interests are likely to result in a minimum of education. 
Additional factors that must be considered are the 
reliability and effectiveness of advance directives. Prob-
lems surrounding advance directives include the possi-
bilitythat a person completing an advance directive may 
not understand it, he may change his mind regarding the 
health care decisions made, or he may not anticipate 
conditions that might arise later. Further, he may 
appoint a surrogate who is unknown to the health care 
provider, someone with whom the provider is uncom-
fortable, or someone unaware of his health care prefer-
ences. 
CONCLUSION 
Although the effect of the HCDA on public aware-
ness of advanced directives in Maryland is relatively 
unknown, the 1993 conference regarding the effect of 
the PSDA demonstrates that there is room for improve-
ment. More people must be encouraged to execute 
advance directives. Following are some suggestions: 
1. Health care providers should do more to pro-
vide information to patients than disseminate it through 
brochures. The admission process when a person 
initially obtains the information should only be the 
beginning. Employees and staff should be ready at all 
times to answer questions regarding health care deci-
sions. In addition, forms should be made available so 
that patients are given the opportunity 
to execute advance directives if they 
wish. Social workers should be avail-
able to initiate discussions and respond 
should also be provided. 
4. Physicians should assume part ofthe responsi-
bility for encouraging advance directives. As men-
tioned earlier, an overwhelming majority of patients 
would like to discuss their health care preferences with 
their physicians, but few actually do. Even if the 
discussions do not lead to written advance directives, a 
legally effective oral directive may result. 
S. The legal profession should also encourage 
advance directives. Approximately seventy-four per-
cent of Americans have WillS,85 but only nine percent 
have advance directives.86 Attorneys are afforded an 
ideal opportunity to discuss advance directives when 
discussing estate planning. 
6. The Secretary of Health and Human Services 
should provide funding for studies on 
advance directives. If the barriers to 
execution of advance directives are 
to questions. Furthermore, the health 
care provider should do everything 
possible to obtain a copy of an advance 
directive if a patient has executed one. 
2. Health care providers must 
provide education for their employees 
and staff. Virtually everyone in an 
institution who has patient contact 
should be prepared to respond to re-
quests for information about advance 
directives. They should be provided 
Advance directives 
protect a patient's 
right to make his 
own health care 
precisely defined, the medical profes-
sion, the legal profession, and health 
care policymakers will be in a better 
position to develop measures to re-
spond to the problem. 
7. The media should also take 
part in a nationwide campaign to en-
courage advance directives. Many 
vehicles should be used, including edi-
torials, newspaper features,87 public 
service announcements, and radio and 




with education regarding both the law 
and institutional policies. In-service 
training should provide information 
about advance directives and 
strengthen communication skills so that employees and 
staff may respond with sensitivity and compassion to 
patients and families in emotional distress. Publications 
and newsletters may assist in informing the employees 
and staff. Ethics committees and social service workers 
would be ideal groups to disseminate information. 
3. Health care providers must also provide com-
munityeducation. They should distribute literature and 
sample forms through their institutions as well as 
churches, service clubs, seniors organizations, legal 
offices, physicians' offices, and libraries. They should 
also establish speaker bureaus, in which trained volun-
teers speak to various organizations. Educational 
programs and informational sessions, with representa-
tives from the institution, physicians, and attorneys, 
television talk shows. 
Advance directives protect a 
patient's right to make his own health 
care decisions before he loses his 
decisionmaking capacity. They ensure that a patient's 
wishes regarding life-sustaining treatment or a surro-
gate decisionmaker are honored even when the patient 
is no longer able to articulate preferences. Furthermore, 
advance directives minimize legal risk and reduce the 
chances of conflicts within the setting of the health care 
provider.88 
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